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Jurisdictional Statement
According to Article III, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, "Except for matters
filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from
the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause."
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads, "An appeal may be taken from a
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all
final orders and judgments." Additionally, Utah Code section 77-18a-1(1) explains, "A
defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from: (a) a final judgment of conviction,
whether by verdict or plea." The Appellant plead guilty to two third degree felonies and
was sentenced in 2007. Defendant filed a Motion to Modify Judgment on July 16, 2010.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case because the Findings and
Order being appealed was the final order issued on his Motion by the Third Judicial
District Court, State of Utah, which is a district court within its jurisdiction.
Statement of Issues and Standards of Review
The first main issue is whether the trial court erred when it incorrectly selected,
interpreted, and/or applied the law regarding claims and assertions made by counsel in
legal memoranda of what his client's testimony would be and then treating them as
evidence, instead of hearsay that would necessitate an evidentiary hearing, and yet stating
that the "arguments should have been raised either in a timely appeal of the Judgment, or
in a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify
Judgment (R.151); see also court findings in Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
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Modify Judgment (R. 149-151) and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Modify
Judgment, Statement of Facts (R. 101-102).
For this first issue, the Court will need to apply the standard of correctness, giving
no deference to the trial court's selection, interpretation, and/or application of Utah law in
relation to counsel's claims in legal memorandum of what his client would testify to at an
evidentiary hearing that was not held. See MacKav v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah
1998). The Court may also apply the standard of plain error in regards to the trial court
treating the Appellant's legal memoranda as evidence and not hearsay and, thereby,
affecting a substantial right of the Appellant. See Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S.
461,467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997).
Related to and part of this first issue is whether the proffered testimony was
sufficient to necessitate an evidentiary hearing to determine the truthfulness of it. See
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify Judgment (R.151). This would also be
reviewed under the same correctness standard.
The second main issue is whether the material findings in the trial court's Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify Judgment (Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Modify Judgment (R. 149-152)) are clearly erroneous after marshaling all the evidence
that supports the Order, and examining whether such evidence is insufficient to support
the findings when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings.
For this second issue, the Court would review the issue under the clearly erroneous
standard after all the evidence supporting the findings is marshaled and viewed in a light
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most favorable to the trial court's material findings in this matter. See MacKav v. Hardv.
973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 1998).
The third main issue is (1) whether the trial court improperly exercised its power
of discretion and was arbitrary in its rejection of a plea agreement between the State and
the Appellant and (2) whether the trial court was in error in the Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Modify Judgment (Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify
Judgment (R.149-151)).
For this issue, the Court would apply the correctness standard, as referenced
above, as it relates to the legal finding of the trial court that "it is the conclusion of the
Court that even if it were determined somehow that the Court had arbitrarily rejected a
plea agreement, there was an adequate explanation for the imposition of the consecutive
sentences." See Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify Judgment (R.151).
The Court would also apply the abuse of discretion standard in regards to the
denial of Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Modify Judgment.

See Rasmussen v.

Sharapata. 895 P. 2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991).
Citation to the Record or Statement of Grounds
According to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5XB), the Appellant
must make "a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the
trial court."

Because the issues in this appeal arose subsequent to the plea and

sentencing, the issues were not persevered through the use of objections at a trial on the
matter.
5

The grounds for review of the post-sentence issues comes from this Court's
jurisdiction as stated above, and, for example, its ability to hear legal errors by the trial
court in its use of fixed principles and rules of law, demonstrating the trial court
incorrectly selected, interpreted, or applied the law. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994). In the instant case, the trial court erred, inter alia, in its use of rules of law
to reject the Appellant's Motion to Modify Judgment.
Constitutional or Statutory Provisions
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives
and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the
dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition
for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being
responsible for the abuse of that right." Utah Const., Art. I, § 1.
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law." Utah Const, Art. I, § 7.
"Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not
be treated with unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, Art. I, § 9.
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
6

offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
"Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule." Utah Const., Art. I, § 12.
"(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court
shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45
days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant,
otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue
or alter bail or recognizance. Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence, (b) On the same grounds that a
7

defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in
defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's
arrest may be issued by the court, (c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no
contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which
shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time
within which any appeal shall be filed. (cX2) If the defendant is convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the
court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition.
The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of
the plea, (d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or
prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the
officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court, (e) The court may correct an
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time, (f) Upon a
verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill
offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code
Ann. § 77-16a-202(lXb), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order." Rule 22(e)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 61.
"(a) Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and (1) Objection. In case the ruling is
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating
the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context;
or (2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the
evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within
which questions were asked. Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record
admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an
objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal, (b) Record of offer and
ruling. The court may add any other or further statement which shows the character of the
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It
may direct the making of an offer in question and answer form, (c) Hearing of jury. In
jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent
inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making
statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury, (d) Plain error.
9

Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Rule 103 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.
'"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules."
Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Statement of Case
This case is criminal in nature. Initially, the trial court that issued a sentence in
this matter could have followed the original plea agreement that had the sentences
running concurrently with a federal sentence that the Defendant/Appellant was already
serving; however, the trial court rejected this plea. On July 16,2010 the Appellant filed a
Motion to Modify Judgment with the trial court in regards to an illegal sentence. On
August 6, 2010, the trial court requested additional information regarding the Appellant's
assertions in a supporting legal memorandum and stated in the court minutes that a
hearing would be scheduled once that information was received. On August 10, 2010,
the Appellant responded with the additional information as the court requested and
reasonably expected to offer testimony evidence at the hearing, which the court had
expressly indicated it would then set. On August 19, 2010, the Court filed an order
denying the Appellant's Motion to Modify without holding a hearing.

10

Statement of Facts
L On or about July 16, 2010, the Defendant/Appellant, who is incarcerated,
submitted a Motion to Modify Judgment in the trial court based upon
memorandum assertions of an illegal sentence. See Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Modify Judgment (R.97-104).
2. On August 6, 2010, the trial court's minute entry stated, "The Court requests a
clarification of certain representations made in the Defendant's Memorandum.
The Defendant suggests that the State agreed, and in fact did recommend
concurrent sentences for the Defendant,

The Court could find no such

recommendation in either the written plea agreement, or in the actual comments
made by the prosecutor at sentencing. Counsel for Defendant to indicate where
and when these recommendations were made by the State's attorney. The matter
will then be set for hearing." See Court Minutes of 8/6/10 (R.120).
3. On August 10, 2010, the Defendant/Appellant responded to the court's request by
indicating where the recommendation was and submitting additional exhibits.
4. The Defendant/Appellant reasonably expected to offer testimony evidence at the
hearing, which the trial court had expressly indicated it would then set.
5. Without the hearing, the trial court filed an order on August 19, 2010 denying the
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Modify Judgment (R.149-152).
6. The Defendant/Appellant timely submitted this appeal, originally, on September
20, 2010, which is thirty-two (32) days after the denial; the thirtieth day landed on
11

a Saturday and this was filed on the first business day, Monday, immediately
following the thirtieth day.
7. The Defendant/Appellant had asserted in the Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Modify Judgment that he "was very surprised by the sentence, considering his
counsel, Catherine Lilly, assured him with guarantees that he would be given
sentences that would run concurrent with the sentences already being served. This
was also the recommendation and assurance of the prosecutor. The only reason
the Defendant plead guilty to the charges against him was because of the
assurance of the prosecution and his counsel" See Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Modify Judgment (R.99).
8. The Defendant/Appellant was never given the opportunity to submit his additional
evidence on what the prosecution and defense counsel had agreed.
9. The evidence would have included testimony evidence from three (3) witnesses
and the procedural history to demonstrate the details of the plea agreement, which
had not been reduced to writing effectively or did not reflect clearly in the
statements to the trial court.
10. The procedural history or transcript of the September 26, 2006 change of plea
hearing would have included the trial court's acknowledgment of the concurrent
sentence agreement when it stated, "And [the convictions] could be sentenced for
the time to run together or run after the other. The courts are not required to
follow the recommendations of the lawyers in this case. Are you satisfied with
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your attorney's representations? MR. CLARK: Absolutely, sir." See Change of
Plea transcript (R. 134-135). Emphasis added.
11. The procedural history or transcript of the February 12, 2007 sentencing would
have included the trial court's explicit statement disregarding the plea agreement
when Judge Robin Reese stated, "You've had a number of charges that have added
up and I'm not going to just roll them into one." See Sentencing transcript
(R.129).
Summary of Argument
The trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing as it indicated it would in
order to hear corroborating testimony about the original plea that was rejected. The court
would not have been able to properly make the findings it entered without the indicated
witness testimony. Further, the original plea agreement was arbitrarily rejected, resulting
in a violation of the Appellant's Due Process and other substantial rights, because
multiple reasons were not stated by the trial court for doing so.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE MEMORANDUM ASSERTIONS WERE NOT EVIDENCE AND NEEDED
CORROBORATING TESTIMONY AS ANTICD?ATED BY THE COURT
According to Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "No error in...the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything...omitted by the court...is ground for...disturbing a judgment or order,"
generally speaking. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error
or defect in the proceeding "which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
13

Id. However, there is an exception. Affecting substantial rights is the exception—the
general rule applies "unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice." Id. See generally Rule 103(a) of the Utah R. Ev., "Error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which...excludes evidence unless a substantial right of
the party is affected."
In this case, because the Defendant/Appellant is incarcerated and will remain so if
no correction is made, the substantial rights affected are liberty from an undue length of
incarceration, freedom from cruel and unusual punishments, and the rights to Due
Process of law. See Utah Const Art, I, §§ 1, 7, 9, 12. There was error in the trial court's
recent order omitting the introduction of material facts and evidence about the
underlying, illegal sentence. See Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
allowing the trial court to "correct'' an illegal sentence, which the court can do "at any
time."
The Defendant/Appellant asserted through his attorney in legal memorandum that
his initial attorney and prosecutor communicated a certain plea agreement to him. The
trial court requested additional information on the details of this plea and promised it
would set a hearing after such submission. The Defendant/Appellant relied on this
assurance, did what was requested by submitting the information, and planned to
introduce the testimonies of his attorney, the prosecutor, and himself, along with
procedural history evidence in order to corroborate the memoranda's hearsay affimiations
of his current counsel.
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Without

setting

the

hearing

as

expressly

indicated,

and,

thereby,

excluding/omitting the testimony evidence, the trial court issued an order denying the
Defendant/Appellant's motion. As a result, the Appellant/Defendant could not have any
of his factual testimony evidence admitted as procedural Due Process would have
permitted. This denial violated multiple substantial rights (see Utah Constitution Article
I, §§ 1 [takes away his inalienable right to defend his "liberties; to...protest against
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances"], 7 [deprives him of "due process of
law"], 9 [causes the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments"], 12 [prevents him
from being able to "defend in person and by counsel,...to testify in his own
behalf... [and] to appeal in all cases"]). Accordingly, the trial court's order of denial must
be "corrected" (see Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) or "disturbed."
See Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This kind of rejection of facts even
makes him a federal habeas applicant, where, according to the U.S. Supreme Court:
[A] federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant
under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is
not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure
employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair
hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;
(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court
hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not
afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 US. 293, 313, 83 S. Ct 745 (1963). Emphasis
added.
Also, as a result of the exclusion-of-material-facts error and the inadequacies in
affording him a full fact hearing on this matter, the Defendant/Appellant's personal
15

liberty cannot be restored as it should be—the expected testimony evidence was entirely
excluded and will never be submitted to the court about concurrent sentencing
agreements, leaving him incarcerated for a longer duration than is appropriate.
Accordingly, the trial court's denial without the promised hearing that was only
conditional upon his submission of additional information, which was met, materially
violated Mr, Clark's procedural Due Process rights. It also will have violated his
substantive Due Process rights to personal liberty when he is ultimately found to be
accurate in his assertions.
The Appellant claims a materially different plea agreement than is acknowledged
currently by the trial court, which is not easily seen in the oral record or written record of
the court, but which evidence exists, and which can be made clearer by the three (3)
anticipated testimonies and the procedural history. The procedural history or transcript of
the September 26, 2006 change of plea hearing shows the trial court's original
acknowledgment of the concurrent sentence agreement when it stated, "And [the
convictions] could be sentenced for the time to run together or run after the other. The
courts are not required to follow the recommendations of the lawyers in this case. Are
you satisfied with your attorney's representations? MR. CLARK: Absolutely, sir." See
Change of Plea transcript (R.134-135). Emphasis added. Based only on the written
record, it appears that "in this case" the lawyers had recommended the sentences to "run
together" and Mr, Clark was very satisfied with that. Id. The procedural history or
transcript of the February 12, 2007 sentencing again acknowledges the trial court's
acknowledgment of the agreement for concurrent sentences and its explicit statement
16

disregarding the plea agreement when Judge Robin Reese stated, "You've had a number
of charges that have added up and I'm not going to just roll them into one." See
Sentencing transcript (R.129).
The trial court's order omitting the testimony evidence from witnesses to
coiroborate the written evidence in the transcripts and relying merely on the hearsay
evidence1 of the memoranda is, therefore, error as an improper application of law, which
must be reviewed for correctness and the order reversed. The order is also based,
presumably, on an insufficiency of the evidence, which must also be reviewed from the
clearly erroneous standard and then reversed.
II.
IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IS FOUND TO SUPPORT THE CLAIMS, THEN
THIS COURT MUST DECIDE IF THE PLEA WAS REJECTED IMPROPERLY
If this Court determines, absent the anticipated witness testimonies and
explanation of the procedural history, that the Defendant/Appellant has established that
the trial court, in fact, rejected certain agreements of an underlying plea agreement, then
this Court must determine (1) whether the trial court failed to follow the legal
requirements in articulating multiple reasons why the plea agreement should not be
followed at sentencing and (2) whether the sentence was illegal as a result of an arbitrary
decision not to follow the plea agreement based on the reason(s) stated, or lack thereof.

1

See Rules 801(c) and 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: '"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules."; see also the persuasive authority in cases
of summary judgment, which are applicable to the summary disposition of the trial court in this matter, u[T]he
submission of a hearsay affirmation by counsel alone does not satisfy this requirement... [for] admissible evidence."
Zndrermmiv City of NY. 49 N.Y. 2d 557, 560,427 NYS 2d 595 (N.Y. Ct App. 1980)).
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Specifically at issue in this case is that the trial court failed to state any proper
reasons why it rejected the plea that the Defendant/Appellant understood he had agreed
to, which was that his sentences would run concurrently with what he was already
serving. In the Utah Code § 76-3-401(2), there are multiple reasons to consider: "In
determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court
shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." There are multiple
reasons that the trial court must state for imposing consecutive sentences.
Here, the plea agreement was for concurrent sentences. This plea was rejected.
The sentencing transcript of the February 12, 2007 records the trial court's explicit
statement disregarding the plea agreement when Judge Robin Reese stated, "You've had
a number of charges that have added up and Vm not going to just roll them into one."
See Sentencing transcript (R.129). Emphasis added. If this statement is considered a
reason for rejection, which the Appellant does not concede that it does, then this single
reason about the "number" of charges, rather than their gravity, certainly does not qualify
as one that considers "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" (Utah Code
§ 76-3-401(2)), as required by the Utah Code.
According to the Utah Supreme Court's holding, a trial court must "state its
reasons for rejecting the plea on the record so as to demonstrate that the court did not
reject the plea arbitrarily." State of Utah v. Montiel 2005 UT 48, f31,122 P.3d 571,581
(Utah 2005). Arbitrariness and the determination of whether more than one reason was
18

stated are legal conclusions after reviewing all of the trial court's dicta.

This

determination, therefore, would be made by the correctness standard. In this case, the
trial court was arbitrary when it failed to state multiple reasons that are legally significant
as to why it was rejecting the plea agreement for concurrent sentences.
Additionally, this Court would apply the abuse of discretion standard. "A failure
to exercise discretion is generally encompassed within the meaning of abuse of
discretion." State v. Loveless, 2010 UT 24, ^[8, 232 P.3d 510, 512 (Utah 2010). This
Court would determine whether the trial court abused the exercise of its discretion in (1)
rejecting the plea and failing to articulate multiple reasons for rejecting the plea
agreement as understood by the attorneys and the Defendant/Appellant at the time of the
change of plea hearing and/or (2) whether the trial court's stated reason(s), if any, are
arbitrary.
The trial court refused an evidentiary hearing on a matter where the
Defendant/Appellant argued in legal memoranda that the plea agreement was not
followed as he reasonably understood it. In our own federal courts, "It is well settled that
we must interpret the agreement according to the defendant's reasonable understanding
of [the plea agreement's] terms." U.S. v. Cachucha, 484 R 3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir.
2007). Similarly, if the evidence is insufficient to establish the exact terms of the plea
agreement, which evidence the Appellant argues is, in fact, insufficient, then this Court
should require the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the
Defendant/Appellant's reasonable understanding of the plea agreement terms he entered
into and then accept or reject the plea without arbitrariness. Otherwise, this Court should
19

correct the illegal sentence by reversing the arbitrary rejection of the plea agreement and
reinstating the terms of concurrent sentences with the sentence the Defendant/Appellant
was already serving. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61; accord State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996) (error that does affect substantial rights of the parties is reversible error,
not harmless error).
CONCLUSION and RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court has not acted by the standards of evidence as indicated in Rule
801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence when considering the Appellant's claims. The trial
court must maintain the integrity of due process, and, accordingly, the court should have
kept its promise to hold a hearing on the motion of the Appellant. Failing to do so not
only casts doubt on judicial prudence, but also on the equality and fairness of the trial
court. The court's decision to not hold an evidentiary hearing made accuratefindingson
the claims impossible. The Court treated the Defendant's memorandum as evidence
instead of an indication of evidence and has, thereby, caused harmful error. This Court
should determine the incorrectness, clearly erroneous nature, and the abuse of discretion
of the recent final order of the trial court denying the Defendant/Appellant's Motion for
Modification of Judgment. The Court should order the trial court to hold an evidentiary
hearing if this Court determines the trial court should have done so on the Motion to
Modify Judgment for the alleged illegal sentence.
Dated this 2nd day of May 2011.

U

Taylor C. Hartley
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